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SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND FAMILY LAW 
by 
Kenneth McK.  Norrie 
 
 
PART I:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Introductory 
On 29th March 2000 the Scottish Parliament passed its fifth piece of 
legislation, the Adults with Incapacities (Scotland) Act 2000.  One small 
provision tucked away in this important legislation amends the definition of 
“nearest relative” in the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, in order to include 
within that phrase members of conjugal same-sex couples1.  The relative 
obscurity of this provision must not hide its import, for this is the first time that 
legislation anywhere in the United Kingdom has expressly and intentionally2 
given recognition, for civil law purposes, to the existence of same-sex family 
relationships. 
 
The readiness with which the Scottish Parliament accepted the need for this 
provision reflects a fundamental shift in social and legal attitudes towards 
sexual orientation though, so far, this shift has manifested itself in only 
isolated and, some might say, relatively unimportant ways.  Whether the 
cracks that have thus appeared in the heterosexist hegemony of 
contemporary family law will develop into a full-scale flood of equality and 
justice, leading to a recognition of the inherent dignity of gay men and 
lesbians and the domestic relationships they enter into or are part of, remains 
to be seen. 
 
 
                                            
1 Adults with Incapacities (Scotland) Act 2000 (2000 asp 4), s. 87(2). 
2 There are other statutes, such as the (English) Rent Act 1977, the Rent (Scotland) Act 
1984, the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 and the (English) Family Law Act 1996 in which 
concepts such as “family” and “household” are wide enough to allow the courts, if they are so 
minded, to include within their terms same-sex relationships: for a discussion from a Scottish 
perspective, see Norrie “We Are Family (Sometimes): Legal Recognition of Same-Sex 
Relationships After Fitzpatrick” (2000) 4 Edin. L.R. 256 at pp.??27-281. 
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There is, however, little doubt that sexual orientation law is fast developing 
and, notwithstanding inevitable setbacks, is doing so in the right direction.  
This of course is a value judgment, which would not meet with acceptance 
from those who cling to a belief in the inherent badness, or immorality, or 
social destructiveness, of homosexuality, but I think it is important to be 
entirely clear right at the beginning from what perspective this chapter is 
written.  It will be the thrust of this chapter that sexual orientation, per se, is 
entirely irrelevant to all the issues that are encompassed within family law and 
that therefore the aim of policy-makers, legislators and judges should be to 
expunge from their thinking those assumptions, policies and rules which either 
discriminate directly against, or by refusing to recognise their existence or by 
assuming the unchallengeability of the heterosexist hegemony indirectly deny 
equal treatment to, gay men, lesbians and same sex relationships3.  Nor is 
equality enough.  The aim of the law should be to ensure justice and that 
notion is, I perceive, wider than equality which is a prerequisite to but not 
definitional of justice.  Justice in this context includes, as well as equal 
treatment, a recognition of the validity and moral legitimacy of gay and lesbian 
lifestyles and families, and of the inherent human dignity of gay and lesbian 
persons.  Relationships gain legitimacy and dignity, and should thereby 
demand the law’s respect, not by being sanctioned by the state or sanctified 
by a religious body, nor by having procreational potential, but through the 
mutuality of respect each member of a relationship shows, as manifested 
through acts of support and commitment.  Judicial and legislative progress 
towards accepting the demands of justice is well underway in most western 
legal systems but it is not of course complete nor even yet at the stage at 
which it is unstoppable.  It has hardly, if at all, started in much of the non-
western world. 
 
 
The Steps Towards Recognition 
                                            
3 It is not the place here to explore the question of the cause or causes of homosexuality (or, 
indeed, heterosexuality).  Anyone who doubts the profound irrelevance of that question is 
referred to B. Macdougall, Queer Judgments: Homosexuality, Expression and the Courts in 
Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 31-47. 
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Kees Waaldijk, in an important study of most of the legal systems in Europe4, 
identifies what he calls a “standard sequence of steps” that legal systems take 
in their developing legal recognition and regulation of same-sex sexual acts 
and same-sex relationships.  The first step is the removal of the criminality of 
(male) homosexual acts5 which existed in many legal systems for most of the 
20th century6 (though not, interestingly, for many years before that7).  
Decriminalisation occurred in England and Wales in 19678 and in Scotland in 
19809.  Non-criminality is now widely seen in Europe as a definitional feature 
of a free and democratic society10; it is not yet perceived as such in many 
other countries, such as the United States.  The second step, far less 
universal, is the enactment of non-discrimination legislation under which it 
becomes impermissible to discriminate against an individual on the ground of 
sexual orientation.  The beneficiaries of this step are both men and women 
                                            
4 See the self-described “sketch” of his on-going work in “Civil Developments:  Patterns of 
Reform in the Legal Position of Same-Sex Partners in Europe” (2000) 17 Rev. Can. Dr. Fam. 
62, expanding on earlier work, “Standard Sequences in the Legal Recognition of 
Homosexuality  -  Europe’s Past, Present and Future” (1994) 4 Australasian Gay and Lesbian 
L. J. 50. 
5 Female homosexual acts were never criminal in Scotland or England or in any other 
European country, not because such acts were acceptable but because they were, to male 
legislators, inconceivable.  The injustice to men of criminalising their activity found an odd 
reflection in the (different and, surely, lesser) injustice to women by their being rendered 
entirely invisible to the law. 
6 Waaldijk points out the historically interesting, though largely unexplained, fact that 
criminalisation occurred in the great 19th century empires of Britain, Russia, Austria and 
Germany, but did not occur in those countries, such as France, the Netherlands, and the 
Iberian and Scandinavian countries which did not develop into empires or (in the case of 
Spain) had by then lost their imperial pretensions.  It may be speculated that the militarism 
essential to hold together vast empires of disparate peoples placed such a high premium on 
both masculinity and high birth rates that sexual acts perceived as being inimical to either 
were seen as a threat to the state’s ability to maintain its geopolitical position.  To me this is a 
more convincing explanation than differences in religious moralities which, in an earlier age, 
would have been indistinguishable from political imperatives. 
7 So for example in the United Kingdom while sodomy (same-sex or opposite-sex) was a 
common law crime, criminality (as opposed to moral opprobrium) was attached to all 
homosexual contact falling short of this only in 1885 with the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 
that year.  For an early prosecution, see Clark & Bendall v. Stuart (1886) 1 White 191. 
8 Sexual Offences Act 1967, s. 1 
9 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980, s. 80.  See now Criminal Law Consolidation (Scotland) 
Act 1995, s. 13, as amended by the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000, s. 1 (UK). 
10 Within those countries that are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
decriminalisation was required after Dudgeon v. UK (1981) 3 EHRR 40, (1982) 3 EHRR 149.  
See also Norris v. Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186 and Modinos v. Cyprus (1993) 16 EHRR 485. 
In the United States of America, on the other hand, the Supreme Court held that it was not 
unconstitutional for states to criminalise a variety of homosexual sexual acts, collectively 
called, in that country, “sodomy”: Bowers v. Hardwick 478 US 186, 92 L Ed 2d 140 (1986).  
Decriminalisation of “sodomy” occurred in South Africa, unusually, as a result of rather than 
as a precursor to the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation:  see National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517, 1999 (1) SA 6. 
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who may equally suffer individual discrimination in fact, irrespective of the 
criminal law’s institutional discrimination.  Such legislation exists, to a greater 
or lesser extent, in a number of countries11, and in many countries where the 
legislature itself has failed to act, the courts have been able to fashion from 
existing provisions a principle of non-discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation.12  The third step, which Waaldijk suggests is unlikely to be taken 
in any individual legal system without the taking of the first two steps, is for 
courts and legislatures to grant legal recognition and protection to the 
domestic relationships that gay men and lesbians enter into.  Waaldijk, 
rationally but perhaps a touch optimistically, sees an internal logic in these 
steps which seems to make the progression inevitable.  He says this: 
 
“Once people engaging in homosexual activity are no longer seen as 
criminals, but instead as citizens, they can hardly be denied their civil 
rights, including their right not to be treated differently because of their 
(criminally irrelevant) sexual orientation.  In this way the step of anti-
discrimination not only follows, but builds on the step of 
decriminalisation.  Similarly, the very idea of non-discrimination with 
regard to sexual orientation, simply demands that no one shall be 
disadvantaged by law because of the gender of the person he or she 
happens to love.  In this way the links between the steps of 
                                            
11 See for example the New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993, s. 21(1)(m) of which prohibits 
sexual orientation discrimination in specified circumstances such as employment, provision of 
services, and access to education; the South African Constitution, s. 9(3) which prohibits 
sexual orientation discrimination in all circumstances (unless, under s. 9(5), this can be 
shown to be fair); and the Northern Ireland Act 1998, s. 75(1) which obliges public authorities 
in Northern Ireland to carry out their functions having regard to “the need to promote equality 
of opportunity  -  (a) between persons of different … sexual orientation”. 
12 In Canada, the Supreme Court held in Vriend v. Alberta (1998) 156 DLR (4th) 385 that 
sexual orientation was a ground analogous to those expressly listed in s.15 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that therefore it was unconstitutional for a province to 
omit sexual orientation discrimination from its non-discrimination provisions.  In Europe, 
sexual orientation has been held to be implicitly included within the terms of art. 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, with the result that it is an impermissible reason for 
discriminating in the application of the substantive rights contained in the European 
Convention:  da Silva Mouta v. Portugal (2001) Fam. L.R. 2.  On the other hand, the Inner 
House of the Court of Session refused to find that sexual orientation discrimination was 
included within the context of sex discrimination for the purposes of the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975 (MacDonald v. Ministry of Defence June 1, 2001).  This Act does not, of course, 
contain a general non-discrimination principle such as is found in the Canadian Charter or, to 
a more limited extent, the European Convention.  Even within the terms of the Act that 
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decriminalisation, anti-discrimination, and partnership legislation are 
not only sequential (in the European countries that have gone that far), 
but also morally and politically compelling”.13 
 
One might depart slightly from Waaldijk’s analysis by splitting the final step of 
relationship recognition into two.  The earlier and easier part of this step 
(which is often taken before the stage of introducing anti-discrimination 
legislation) is to give ad hoc recognition for a limited number of carefully 
delineated and, by and large, uncontroversial purposes  -  this is the stage 
that the Scottish Parliament has now reached  -  and the later and politically 
more dangerous part of the step is to grant recognition to same-sex 
relationships in all circumstances in which opposite-sex relationships are 
recognised by the law.  Only a very few countries in the world have gone this 
far. 
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to explore, in Part II, the developing legal 
approach to same-sex relationships, primarily but not exclusively within the 
context of the law in the United Kingdom: it will be seen that legal systems 
across the world are responding, at an ever-quickening pace, to the social 
and moral changes in society which are leading to a rejection of the 
intolerance and even hatred to which gay men and lesbians, and same-sex 
couples, were commonly (and sometimes still are) subjected.  The interesting 
questions, which will be addressed in Part III, are (i) why is this happening 
and (ii) what does this tell us about the nature and purpose of contemporary 
family law?  
 
 
 
PART II: RECOGNITION: THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE UK 
 
Indirect Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships 
                                                                                                                             
conclusion was not inevitable, as shown by the fact that one judge dissented (on the question 
of the correct comparator to adopt in a case of discrimination).  
13 Note 4 above, 17 Rev. Can. Dr. Fam. at 86. 
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Even before any explicit protections were extended to same-sex relationships, 
the law was being forced, if reluctantly, to acknowledge their existence and 
even to accept their validity.  This occurred primarily in relation to disputes 
over children.  It is one of the paradoxes of the law that while, as we will see, 
shielding children from homosexual influences has long been one of the main 
(though always spurious) arguments against the law legitimising same-sex 
relationships, and there are many provisions remaining in the law designed to 
make access to the status of “parent” difficult for gay people14, it was in child 
law cases that judges first had to deal, in family law terms, with gay men and 
lesbians15.  
 
“Gay Parenting is Bad for Children” 
Originally, and unsurprisingly, judges tended to consider it axiomatic that it 
was against the welfare of children to be brought up by gay men or lesbians 
or to be exposed to gay or lesbian lifestyles.  The assumptions inherent in 
such a view have been well-exposed in the literature16.  The beauty of an 
                                            
14 Adoption by couples is available only to married persons (Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978, s. 
14, Adoption Act 1976 (England), s. 14.  Fostering of children by a same-sex couple is, in 
Scotland, prohibited (Fostering of Children (Scotland) Regulations 1996 (SI 1996 No 3263 
(S.253)), r. 12(4)).  Pregnancy as a result of donated sperm will help some lesbians become 
“parent” but their partners cannot adopt unless the birth parent gives up her rights, which 
would seldom be in the interests of the child and so seldom practically available (see Re an 
Application by T [1998] NZFLR 769); a parenting order after a surrogacy arrangement (which 
is likely to be used by male couples rather than female couples) is unavailable under s. 30 of 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 since that order, like a joint adoption order, 
is available only to married couples (s. 30(1)).  And initial access by either a single woman (of 
whatever sexual orientation) or a lesbian couple to infertility treatment is, while not prohibited, 
certainly inhibited by s. 13(5) of the 1990 Act which requires the provider of licenced infertility 
services to take account of the child’s need for a “father”.  “Father” in this, and other, 
provisions in the 1990 Act means a chromosomally male person: X, Y and Z v. UK (1997) 24 
EHRR 143. 
15 Family law is not, however, the only area in which judicial fears for the safety of children 
manifest themselves.  In Saunders v. Scottish National Camps Association [1980] IRLR 174 
an Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld a decision of an Industrial Tribunal which refused to 
find unfair the dismissal of a man for being gay.  They held that the Industrial Tribunal were 
entitled to find that a considerable proportion of employers would restrict the employment of 
homosexuals when required to work in proximity to children.  The Court of Session found 
other reasons to uphold this wicked decision ([1981] IRLR 277) but they certainly did not 
distance themselves from these comments.  The approach in Saunders is reflected in some 
jurisdictions’ statutory law, such as some Australian states, where anti-discrimination 
provisions sometimes contain exceptions in relation to work involving children: see for 
example s. 28 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (QLD) and s. 37 of the Anti-Discrimination 
Act 1992 (NT). 
16 See, in particular, Boyd “What is a `Normal’ Family? (1992) 55 MLR 269, “Lesbian (and 
Gay) Custody Claims:  What Difference Does Difference Make?” (1997) 15 Can. J. Fam. L. 
131; Reece, “Subverting the Stigmatisation Argument” (1996) 23 J. Law & Soc. 484; Millbank, 
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axiom, of course, is that it avoids the need for an explanation of the fears 
behind it.  One could understand, without subscribing to, this assessment of 
welfare when the shadow of criminality hung over those bringing up children17, 
but once that shadow was removed it became all the more essential to 
subject judicial fears to rational scrutiny.  And as this happened, these fears 
have been revealed as chimerae. 
 
Helen Reece18 points out that until about the late 1970s the fear that children 
would be contaminated with homosexuality (i.e. would either be sexually 
abused or would become gay or lesbian themselves) was the main judicial 
concern lurking behind most of the decisions,19 but that since then the main 
concern has switched to the fear of the child being stigmatised and picked on 
and bullied as a result of a gay parent’s sexuality.  She suggests that the 
reason for this shift in approach was that the corruption argument was clearly 
judgmental (and unsustainable in the light of social and psychological 
research20) while the stigmatisation argument appears to be benignly neutral 
                                                                                                                             
“Same-Sex Couples and Family Law”, accessible at 
www.familycourt.gov.au/papers/html/millbank.html; Barton, “The Homosexual in the Family” 
[1996] Fam. Law 626. 
17 Though criminality was never an issue in the UK with lesbians, and it is gay women who 
remain much more likely than gay men to be bringing up children, the criminality attached to 
men certainly affected the social and judicial perception of women in same-sex relationships.  
In some jurisdictions in the US anti-sodomy legislation survives, and “sodomy” is defined to 
mean all sexual activity except penile penetration of the vagina, with the result that lesbian 
sex is unlawful, and that fact has been used to deny lesbian women custody of their children: 
see for example Bottoms v. Bottoms 444 SE 2d 276 (Va. 1994). 
18 “Subverting the Stigmatisation Argument” (1996) 23 J. Law & Soc. 484. 
19 See e.g. Re D (Adoption: Parent’s Consent) [1977] AC 602 where Lord Wilberforce was 
unwilling to contemplate a gay man bringing up his child because of the risk that this “may 
lead to severance from normal society, to psychological stress and unhappiness and possibly 
even to physical experiences which may scar them for life” (at 629).  In L & L (1983) FLC 91-
353 the High Court of Australia granted custody to a lesbian mother, but emphasised 
repeatedly that they were doing so because they were persuaded that she would “not 
encourage the children to become homosexual”.  In JLP v. DJP 643 SC 2d 865 (Mo 1982) 
the Missouri court said this (in the face of expert testimony that homosexual child abuse was 
uncommon): “Given the statistical incidence of homosexuality in the population … 
homosexual molestation is probably, on an absolute basis, more prevalent” (in other words, 
gay men are, self-evidently, more likely to abuse children than non-gay men.  The court 
continued: “Every trial judge … knows that the molestation of minor boys by adult males is not 
as uncommon as the psychological expert’s testimony indicated” (in other words, it is within 
judicial knowledge that homosexual child abuse is more prevalent that the evidence 
presented to the court showed). 
20 See in particular the important studies by Tasker and Golombok in the UK: “Children 
Raised by Lesbian Mothers: The Empirical Evidence” (1991) Fam. L. 184, and “Do Parents 
Influence the Sexual Orientation of their Children?  Findings From a Longitudinal Study of 
Lesbian Families” (1996) 32 Developmental Psychology 3; and Patterson in the USA: 
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by focussing on the child itself and more appropriate, therefore, for judicial 
expression.  But she also points out that the risk of stigmatisation is, 
according to the research, as illusory as the risk of corruption.  And Susan 
Boyd makes the powerful point that the stigmatisation argument “allows one 
discriminatory act (homophobia in the community) to condone another 
(depriving lesbians and homosexual men of custody)”21.  Yet the 
stigmatisation argument remains the preferred weapon of choice for judges 
seeking to deny gay parents residence of their children: because, Reece 
suggests, its very plausibility in theory dispenses with the need to prove it in 
reality. 
 
This can be seen in a series of custody cases whose reasoning, from today’s 
perspective, appears deeply flawed.  In Re P (A Minor) (Custody)22 a father 
sought to deprive a lesbian mother of custody while failing to offer the children 
a home himself  -  he argued that the children should be removed to local 
authority care.  The Court of Appeal would not go that far but they did indicate 
that living in promimity to “sexual deviance” could “only be countenanced by 
the courts when it is driven to the conclusion” that there is no acceptable 
alternative.  It was assumed, in other words, that living with a lesbian (or, 
presumably, a gay man) was the very last option (before local authority care) 
that ought to be considered.  Eight years later the terminology of “deviance” 
had been dropped, but in B v. B (Minors) (Custody, Care and Control)23 it was 
still assumed that the parent’s homosexuality was a strongly negative factor in 
a custody dispute.  In that case Judge Callman awarded custody to the 
lesbian mother, having found no evidence in the literature or research to 
support fears for the child’s sexual orientation or for the risk of stigmatisation.  
However, he felt constrained to point out “categorically” that it was important 
                                                                                                                             
“Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents” (1992) 63 Child Development 1025.  A wealth of 
research material has also been gathered together by McNeill, “The Lack of Differences 
Between Gay/Lesbian and Heterosexual Parents: A Review of the Literature” (1998) National 
Journal of Sexual Orientation Law, vol 4 issue 1, accessible at 
http://metalab.unc.edu/gaylaw/issue6/Mcneill.htm.  Reece herself draws on an extensive 
array of this literature, not only to refute the corruption argument but to draw attention to some 
of the social benefits of gay parenting. 
21 “What is a `Normal’ Family?” (1992) 55 Mod. L.R. 269 at 274. 
22 (1983) 4 FLR 401. 
23 [1991] Fam. L. 174, [1991] 1 FLR 402. 
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to distinguish between, on the one hand, lesbians “who were private persons 
who did not believe in advertising their lesbianism” (like the mother in the 
present case)24 and, on the other hand, “militant lesbians who tried to convert 
others to their way of life”.  Not only does the judge explicitly prefer gey 
women to remain within a heterosexually imposed realm of invisibility but, 
having in one part of his judgment dismissed reliance on unproveable fears 
based on stereotyping, he falls precisely into that trap when faced with the 
hypothetical militant proselytising lesbian.  The implicit message is clear even 
from this case in which the lesbian mother was awarded custody:  it would be 
bad for a child to grow up gay, which is of course the central flaw in the 
“corruption/conversion/contamination” argument25 which the judge purports to 
reject. 
 
Lord Davidson in the Outer House of the Court of Session did not even 
distinguish between the “good” (i.e. invisible) and the “bad” (i.e. public) lesbian 
in Early v. Early26, when he removed an eight year old child from the mother 
who had always looked after him and awarded custody to his father, who had 
never looked after him and who had two convictions for child neglect27.  The 
judge said that he was concerned about the fact that the child, living in a 
lesbian household, would have no male role models and might be teased at 
school.  This case is remarkable in that the stigmatisation argument was 
deployed even while it was accepted (notice the “might” at the end of the 
preceding sentence) that there was no evidence in the instant case that the 
fear had any basis in the reality of the life of the child whose future was being 
decided.  
                                            
24 This had been a concern also in Re P (above) where Arnold P (at 404) clearly warmed to 
the mother because “she is not one of those homosexuals who, as many do nowadays, flaunt 
their homosexuality”.  Such flaunting of judicial heterosexuality is not uncommon. 
25 Leaving aside entirely, as unworthy of comment, the assumptions (i) that conversion is 
possible and (ii) that attempts at conversion are ever actually made. 
26 1989 SLT 114, affirmed 1990 SLT 221. 
27 Both the Outer House and the Inner House judges denied that the mother’s lesbianism was 
a decisive factor, but it is interesting to compare the minimal time both Lord Davidson and the 
Inner House spent worrying about the father’s convictions with the time they spent worrying 
about the mother’s lesbianism. 
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A rather different, but equally problematical, approach was adopted in the 
English decision of C v. C (A Minor) (Custody: Appeal)28.  Here Ward J had 
granted custody of a child to the mother, but was overruled for giving wholly 
inadequate weight to the fact that she had entered into a lesbian relationship.  
The Court of Appeal said that this fact would clearly have an effect on the 
child and that this had to be taken into account.  The importance of that 
consideration turned on the issue of “normality” and its  -  again self-evident  -  
attractions.  Glidewell LJ said: 
 
“Despite the vast changes during the last 30 years or so in the attitudes 
of society to the institution of marriage, to sexual morality and to 
homosexual relationships, I regard it as axiomatic that the ideal 
environment for the upbringing of a child is the home of loving and 
sensible parents.  When a marriage breaks down and that ideal cannot 
be attained and the court is called upon to decide which of two possible 
alternatives is then preferable for the child’s welfare, its task is to 
choose the alternative which comes closest to that ideal”29. 
 
Leaving aside both the clumsy assumption that loving and sensible parents 
are always married and the fact that the axiom which founds the judge’s 
reasoning is empirically unsubstantiated, the flaw in this approach is that it is 
unworkable in the absence of an evaluation of the factors that make any 
particular family form “ideal”.  Given that the family form of mother, father 
(married to each other) and child is not on offer, we cannot tell which is closer 
to that form if the options are either (i) mother, lesbian partner and child or (ii) 
single father and child, without making a value-judgment on single 
parenthood, sexual orientation, and even male parenting.  This lack of 
evaluation permits the judge to hide his negative assumptions about sexuality.  
Balcombe LJ held30 that the judge had to choose which of the two available 
                                            
28 [1991] Fam. L. 175, [1991] 1 FLR 223. 
29 [1991] 1 FLR at 228. 
30 At 231. 
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options “can offer the nearest approach to [the] norm” but that approach is 
flawed for the same reason.  The fact that one option is closer to the “norm” 
than another is a matter of entirely neutral statistics.  It is, for example, a 
departure from normality for a child to be brought up by a left-handed parent.  
But that tells us nothing about the child’s welfare until we put a value on left-
handedness or right-handedness.  Only once a value is attributed (preferably 
founded on empirical evidence rather than assumptions and preconceptions) 
are we able to use it in the welfare balance  -  and a zero value such as would 
be attributed to left- or right-handedness renders the matter irrelevant to the 
application of the welfare test.  It is likewise a departure from the norm (given 
that, statistically, there are fewer gay people than non-gay people) for a child 
to be brought up by a gay or lesbian parent, or for that matter by a single 
father, but these matters are in themselves irrelevant to the welfare test until 
such time as a value other than zero is attributed to them.  It is entirely 
illegitimate ever to assume a negative (or, for that matter, a positive) value as 
“axiomatic”. 
 
“Gay Parenting is Bad ... Or Is It?” 
From about the mid-1990s, courts in the United Kingdom began to be more 
sanguine at the idea of gay and lesbian parenting, and at co-parenting by 
same-sex partners. In Re H (A Minor) (Section 37 Direction)31 and Re C (A 
Minor) (Residence Order: Lesbian Co-parents)32 joint residence orders were 
made in favour of lesbian couples one of whom had each, through donor 
insemination, given birth to a child.  And in G v. F (Contact and Shared 
Residence: Applications for Leave)33 on the breakdown of the relationship 
between a lesbian couple the ex-co-parent was granted leave to make an 
application for contact and shared residence34.  The watershed case in judicial 
attitudes in the UK to gay and lesbian parenting in the 1990s is the Scottish 
                                            
31 [1993] Fam. L. 205. 
32 [1994] Fam. L.R 468, [1994] Practitioner’s Child Law Bulletin 95. 
33 [1998] 2 FLR 798. 
34 For an unreported Scottish case involving a lesbian mother in which an ex-partner was held 
to have title to seek a s. 11 order over a child, see R v. F, discussed by J. Fotheringham 1999 
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adoption case of T, Petitioner35 in which the Inner House of the Court of 
Session granted an adoption petition made by a gay man notwithstanding that 
he shared his life with a male partner who would take an active part in the 
upbringing of the child.  The judge at first instance (Lord Gill) had refused to 
grant the adoption (notwithstanding that it was opposed by no-one) on the 
basis that the fact that the petitioner was gay raised a “fundamental question 
of principle”.  The Inner House held that there was no such fundamental 
question and that the judge was wrong to base his decision on his own 
unsupported “preconceptions about homosexuality”.36  The importance of this 
decision lies in its rejection of the stereotyping to which gay men and lesbians 
had previously been judicially subjected37.  It explicitly rejects the convenience 
of axiom which assumes without proof that gay or lesbian parents constitute 
some threat of harm to their children.  Since T, Petitioner and its English 
equivalent it ought not to be sufficient in a British court to raise the 
homosexuality of a parent or prospective parent and expect the court to 
assume some harm, though, of course, it always and rightly remains open to 
any party to lead evidence to show that a particular person constitutes a risk 
of harm to a particular child. 
 
The approach exemplified by T, Petitioner ought now to b regarded as 
entrenched in British constitutional law with the incorporation by the Human 
Rights Act 1998 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
requirement on domestic courts to follow the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights38.  That jurisprudence requires that discrimination in 
                                                                                                                             
SLT (News) 337. 
35 1997 SLT 724.  For comment, see K. Norrie, “Parental Pride: Adoption and the Gay Man” 
1996 SLT (News) 321, and M. Ross, “Attitudes to Sexual Orientation in Adoption Law” (1997) 
1 Edin. L.R. 370. 
36 Per Lord President Hope at 735L.  The case was followed in England in Re W (A Minor) 
(Adoption: Homosexual Adopter) [1997] 3 All ER 620.  See also Re E (Adoption: Freeing 
Order) [1995] 1 FLR 382 and the Canadian decision in Re K and B (1995) 125 DLR (4th) 653. 
37 It is stereotyping that, for reasons most eloquently explained by Ackermann J in National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister for Home Affairs, 1999 (3) BCLR 280 at 
para 44, constitutes the most direct attack on the human dignity of gay men and lesbians.  
Stereotyping of human beings was the basis of Nazi philosophy. 
38 Human Rights Act 1998, s.2  See I. Karsten, “Atypical Families and the Human Rights Act:  
The Rights of Unmarried Fathers, Same-Sex Couples and Transsexuals” (1999) EHRLR 195. 
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relation to the substantive rights contained in the Convention (including the 
right to respect for family life39) be permitted only when it has an objective and 
reasonable justification, that is to say when it has a legitimate aim, and when 
there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between that legitimate 
aim and the means employed to achieve it.40  The doctrine of proportionality 
requires an examination of the facts in each individual case and a rejection of 
stereotypical assumptions that might not be relevant in the particular 
circumstances before the court.  In da Silva Mouta v. Portugal41 the ECtHR 
held that while the identification and protection of a child’s welfare was clearly 
a legitimate aim, the means adopted to further that end, being a blanket 
discrimination against gay men and lesbians in residence disputes, was 
unjustified42.  Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, it was held (for 
the first time, incidentally), came within the terms of article 14 and could not 
possibly be justified.43 
 
So, from a position in the 1980s in which the courts regarded same-sex 
relationships as “deviance” from which children had to be protected, they are, 
at the turn of the 21st century, to be seen as in no way morally inferior to 
opposite-sex relationships, as an environment suitable for the bringing up of 
                                            
39 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(1).  The European Court of Human Rights 
has not yet extended the right to family life to same-sex couples, but the House of Lords held 
that such a couple can be “family” within the terms of domestic legislation (Fitzpatrick v. 
Sterling Housing Association [1999] 4 All ER 707).  The French Conseil d’Etat did, however, 
hold that same-sex couples come within “family life” for the purposes of art. 8 in Prefet des 
Alpes Maritimes c. M. Marroussitch April 28, 2000 (2000 Pub. L. 731) when it decided that 
deportation of a non-national in a stable and long-term relationship with a French person of 
the same sex was a disproportionate infringement of his art. 8 right to family life. 
40 Marckx v. Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330 at para. 33; Inze v. Austria (1987) 10 EHRR 394, 
para 41; Schmidt v. Germany (1994) 18 EHRR 513, para 24. 
41 (2001) Fam. L.R. 2. See Norrie, “Stay Standing if you Like Gay People” (2000) SCOLAG 
34. 
42 The extent to which this case can be used by members of same-sex couples to access 
other family law rights and liabilities in Scots and English law is explored in Norrie 
“Constitutional Challenges to Sexual Orientation Discrimination” (2000) 49 ICLQ 755. 
43 The same constitutional entrenchment of protection from sexual orientation discrimination 
can be seen in V v. V 1998 (4) SA 169 where the South African court founded upon the South 
African Constitution (and, interestingly, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child) to reject a father’s claim for sole custody on the basis that the mother’s lesbian 
relationship might affect the children’s sexual orientation.  This decision renders the dreadful 
decision of Van Rooyen v. Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 redundant. 
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children44.  Once that position has been reached, the way is open for same-
sex relationships to attract in their own right, independently of children, legal 
recognition and protection.  
 
Direct Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships 
Beyond the acceptance of same-sex relationships insofar as they involved 
children, the law in most jurisdictions until very recently simply ignored the fact 
that gay men and lesbians not only had sex with each other but also lived 
their lives together, undertook commitments towards each other and shared 
bonds of affection: these facts were of no concern to the law and carried no 
legal consequences.  However, as the years passed from decriminalisation, 
and society’s attitudes towards gay men and lesbians changed so that they 
came to be accepted in all walks of life  -  even at the highest levels of 
government  -  the issue moved from the private to the public, from the 
demand (now partially achieved45) to allow individuals a private (sex) life 
without state interference when that did not infringe on the rights of others, to 
the demand (still remote from achievement) to allow individuals to enter into 
unions bearing the full civic rights and responsibilities that attach to opposite-
sex relationships.  At first, such a demand met with uncomprehending 
resistance.  Statute declared in 1988, famously and ungrammatically, that 
“homosexuality” was a “pretended family relationship”46, and any government 
                                            
44 There still remain, anomalously, statutory inhibitions on gay people accessing the status of 
“parent”  -  see n. 14 above. 
45 Decriminalisation of gay male sexual acts has only partially fulfilled the demand for sexual 
equality.  There is in the first place the (important) symbolism of language.  The Criminal Law 
(Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 13, which permits men to have sex with each other, 
permits what it describes as “sodomy” and “gross indecency” and “shameless indecency”: by 
this means the criminal law continues to constitute gay men (and by implication lesbians) as 
“other”:  I make love, you have sex, he is grossly indecent.  Secondly, sex between men 
remains more heavily regulated than sex between men and women (and far more regulated 
than sex between women), as is seen in Scotland by comparing s. 13 of the 1995 Act with the 
earlier provisions in the same act regulating (for purely protective reasons) non-gay sex.  
Thirdly, we continue to see a preference shown for non-gay sex in, for example, the mental 
health legislation where the criminality of sexual acts with those of compromised 
understanding is much more tightly drawn for non-gay sex than for gay (male) sex  -  
compare s.106 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 with s. 13(3) of the Criminal Law 
(Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995. 
46 Local Government Act 1986, s. 2A, inserted by Local Government Act 1988, s. 28; 
repealed (in Scotland) by the Ethical Standards in Public Life etc. (Scotland) Act 2000 (asp 7) 
s. 34. 
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that passed such substantively meaningless47 but symbolically malicious 
legislation was unlikely to enact other legislation conferring even the smallest 
degree of legitimacy on same-sex relationships.  But governments, like walls, 
fall.  Even before the eventual repeal (in Scotland) of the 1988 declaration, 
courts in the United Kingdom were able to fashion remedies out of the stuff of 
the common law which could be accessed by same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples alike, and even, in rare but significant situations, interpret the 
statutory law to apply to both types of couple. 
 
In Tilsley v. Milligan48, for example, the House of Lords accepted the existence 
of a “common intention constructive trust”49 between two lesbians50:  this is an 
(admittedly clumsy) way of providing for property readjustment on the break 
up of a relationship.  And in Wayling v. Jones51 the plaintiff successfully 
utilised the concept of proprietary estoppel to claim a portion of the estate of 
his deceased same-sex partner.52  In neither of these cases, however, did the 
sexual orientation of the claimant, or the same-sex nature of their 
relationships, have much bearing on the issue, which was whether the 
common law doctrines involved applied in the particular circumstances of 
these cases53.  All that can be taken from them is the dog (morality) that did 
not bark.  Rather more significant is the case of Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing 
                                            
47 See Norrie, “Symbolic and Meaningless Legislation” (1988) 33 JLSS 310, and “How to 
Promote Homosexuality:  A Guide for Schools and Colleges” 1989 SCOLAG 74. 
48 [1993] 3 All ER 65. 
49 Developed in the domestic relations context by the House of Lords in Pettitt v. Pettitt [1970] 
AC 777 and Gissing v. Gissing [1971] AC 886.  That the unmarried nature of the relationship 
is irrelevant was confirmed in Grant v. Edwards [1986] 1 Ch. 638.  For a discussion, see S. 
Gardner “Rethinking Family Property” (1993) 109 LQR 263 and J. Mee, The Property Rights 
of Cohabitees (Hart, 1999). 
50 See, to similar effect, the Canadian decision of Anderson v. Luomo (1985) 14 DLR (4th) 749 
and the New Zealand decision of Hamilton v. Jurgens [1996] NZFLR 350. 
51 [1995] 2 FLR 1029. 
52 In the Australian case of W v. G (1996) 20 Fam. L.R. 49 (NSW) the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel was used by one ex-partner of a lesbian relationship against the other ex-partner to 
force the latter to contribute to the costs of bringing up the children born to the former during 
the course of the relationship.  See J. Millbank “An Implied Promise to Parent: Lesbian 
Families, Litigation and W v. G” (1996) 10 Aust. J. Fam. L. 112, R. Bailey-Harris, “Equity Still 
Child-Bearing in Australia?” (1997) 113 L.Q.R. 227. 
53 The success of this approach depends, of course, on the existing legal environment and 
the legal materials available from which remedies can be fashioned.  Scots law recognises 
constructive trusts and so property readjustment at the breakdown of a relationship might be 
possible in Scotland; proprietary estoppel and dependents’ claims to succession do not exist 
in Scotland and a claim such as in Wayling could not be made here. 
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Association54 in which the House of Lords signals a more functionalist than 
formalist approach to family law.  The plaintiff was the survivor of a same-sex 
couple, who sought to succeed to the tenancy held by his now-deceased 
partner on the basis that he was either the “spouse” of the deceased tenant or 
a “member of the tenant’s family”.  His claim to be a “spouse” failed on the 
basis that the word is necessarily limited to a partner of the opposite sex, but 
he was successful in his claim to be a member of his partner’s family.  The 
majority in the House of Lords interpreted “family” by looking at its function 
rather than at its form, with the important issue being how the relationship 
operates rather than its precise legal status.  Though the technical effect of 
this decision was extremely limited, given that there are very few statutory 
benefits and liabilities accessed through the concept of “family”55, its symbolic 
importance is profound.  A “family” is a socially acceptable grouping of 
individuals and by accepting the concept of the gay family the House of Lords 
has conferred upon same-sex relationships a legitimacy (both social and 
legal) that they never had before.  Further, in adopting a functionalist 
approach to determining which relationships are open to legal recognition and 
protection, the House of Lords is moving away from a status based approach 
to family law in general.  This is a matter to which we shall return. 
 
Developments Abroad 
In 1999, as well as the non-constitutional decision of the House of Lords in 
Fitzpatrick, courts in three other English speaking jurisdictions handed down 
judgments, the importance of which it is difficult to overstate, in cases in which 
the different treatment afforded same-sex and opposite-sex couples was 
directly, and successfully, challenged as being unconstitutional56.  The 
Supreme Court of Canada held unconstitutional an Ontario provision57 which 
provided for the awarding of financial readjustment on the breakup of both 
                                            
54 [1999] 4 All ER 707.  For comment, see Norrie, “We Are Family (Sometimes): Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships After Fitzpatrick” (2000) 4 Edin. L.R. 256; L. 
Glennon, “Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association: An Endorsement of the Functional 
Family” (2000) 14 Int. J. Law Pol. & the Family 226. 
55 See Norrie, above at 271-276. 
56 For a fuller discussion of these cases than is necessary here, see Norrie, “Constitutional 
Challenges to Sexual Orientation Discrimination” (2000) 49 ICLQ 755. 
57 The Ontario Family Law Act 1990, s. 29(1). 
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married relationships and unmarried but heterosexual relationships58; the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa held unconstitutional an immigration law59 
which allowed entry into South Africa of “spouses” of South African citizens 
but excluded, through their inability to marry, the same-sex partners of such 
citizens60; and the Supreme Court of Vermont held it to be unconstitutionally 
discriminatory for the state to confer on married couples a whole raft of rights 
and responsibilities while not providing any means by which same-sex 
couples could access the same rights and responsibilities61.  The most 
interesting feature about these three cases is the similarity in the arguments 
that the state in each used to justify the difference in treatment between 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples62.  In secular societies which had long 
since decriminalised gay male sexual acts, and in which non-discrimination 
legislation was well-embedded, the states could not argue on the basis of the 
inherent “wrongness” of same-sex relationships, though one is left with the 
impression, from the poverty of the arguments that were in fact advanced, that 
this was the underlying political stance.  Predictably, the main justification put 
forward in all three cases was the need to protect children.  This argument is 
illogical in those jurisdictions, like Vermont, which allow same-sex couples to 
adopt, and it was summarily dismissed as such there.  But it is also illogical in 
any jurisdiction which countenances gay or lesbian people bringing up 
children, for this is an acceptance, as explained above, that children do not 
need to be protected from gayness per se.  Another argument common to all 
three cases was that the exclusion of same-sex couples from legal recognition 
is necessary to protect the “traditional” family.  There is no substance to this 
argument either since the legal rights and liabilities of those entering into 
“traditional” relationships are entirely unaffected by extending the rights and 
liabilities to others.  In truth, those who claim to “protect” the traditional family 
                                            
58 M v. H (1999) 171 DLR (4th) 577. 
59 The Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991. 
60 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister for Home Affairs 1999 (3) BCLR 
280.  For comment, see R. Louw, “Gay and Lesbian Partner Immigration and the Redefining 
of Family” (2000) 16 SAJHR 313; S. Motara, “Making the Bill of Rights a Reality for Gay and 
Lesbian Couples” (2000) 16 SAJHR 344; de Vos “Sexual Orientation and the Right to 
Equality in the South African Constitution” (2000) 117 SALJ 17; and Pantazis, “Lesbian and 
Gay Youth in Law” (2000) 117 SALJ 51. 
61 Baker v. Vermont 744 A2d 864 (1999). 
62 See further, Norrie, “Constitutional Challenges”, n. 56 above at 762-766. 
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are seeking to preserve its special and preferred status63, but since non-
marital relationships have long been given some protection the argument 
resolves into one of maintaining an institutional preference for heterosexuality 
and has little to do with “family” as such. 
 
Other legal systems have granted comprehensive statutory recognition of 
same-sex relationships to the extent of putting them in the same legal position 
as opposite-sex, though unmarried, couples.  This is the case, for example, in 
New South Wales64, New Zealand65, in the Canadian provinces (following the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in M v. H)66, and in the Spanish 
autonomous regions of Aragon and Catalonia67.  Some jurisdictions have gone 
significantly further and created an institution for same-sex couples which has 
more or less all the legal consequences of the opposite-sex institution of 
marriage.  Denmark, as is well known, was the first country in the world to do 
so, calling the institution (in English translation) “Registered Partnerships”68, 
                                            
63 In some countries marriage itself is given a special constitutionally preferred status.  This is 
the case, for example, in Germany where art. 6 of the Grundgesetz requires the state to give 
the institution of marriage “special” (besonderen) protection.  This has been interpreted to 
mean, for example, that in tax law married couples must be treated more favourably than 
single persons or unmarried couples:  see D. Hesselberger, Das Grundgesetz, vol. II, pp. 
104-107.  Art. 12 of the ECHR protects the “right to marry” but while marriage for that purpose 
is the “traditional” monogamous heterosexual union (see Rees v. UK (1987) 9 EHRR 56 and 
Cossey v. UK (1990) 13 EHRR 622) there is no implication that the state must give 
preferential treatment to such traditional unions as opposed to other unions, just as the right 
to found a family in the same article does not require the state to treat groupings of individuals 
better than individuals.  Similarly, the limitation of art. 12 to “traditional” unions does not inhibit 
the state conferring identical  -  or even, for that matter, greater  -  rights on other unions 
(otherwise we get the implausible result that those countries that have extended the 
consequences of marriage to cohabitants and registered partnerships are in breach of art. 
12).  Nor does the limitation of art. 12 to marriage as presently understood inhibit any state’s 
right to vary its rules of entry:  if the Netherlands is in breach of art. 12 by opening up 
marriage to same-sex couples then so too was the United Kingdom when it opened up 
marriage between ex-in-laws (Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act 1986. 
64 See the Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (NSW), which amends 
the previously titled De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (now the Property (Relationships) Act 
1984). 
65 See the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001, the Administration Amendment Act 
2001 and the Family Protection Amendment Act 2001. 
66 (1999) 171 DLR (4th) 577 
67 See Roca, “Regulation of Same-Sex Partnerships from a Spanish Perspective”, in Making 
Law for Families, ed Maclean, (Hart 2000) at 95 et. seq. 
68 For a discussion of these provisions, see L. Nielsen, “Family Rights and the `Registered 
Partnership in Denmark’” (1990) 4 Int. J. Law & Fam. 297; M. Broberg, “The Registered 
Partnership for Same-Sex Couples in Denmark” (1996) 8 C. & Fam. L. Q 149.  It should be 
noted that the rule described in these articles prohibiting registered partners from jointly 
adopting was removed in 1999. 
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and this lead has been followed by Iceland, Sweden, Norway69 and the 
Netherlands70.  France too has created an institution of registered 
cohabitation71, open to same-sex and opposite-sex couples.  As a result of the 
case of Baker v. Vermont, the state of Vermont became the first in the United 
States to introduce a similar institution, called there “civil unions”72. 
 
Marriage 
So far, only one country in the world has taken what some see as the ultimate 
family law step and opened up its definition of marriage to include same-sex 
couples73.  This occurred on April 1, 2001 in the Netherlands74.  But claims by 
same-sex couples to access that institution have been made in many 
countries and are not new.  As early as 1971 attempts were being made to 
persuade US courts that statutes limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples 
were unconstitutional.75   These attempts were at that time uniformly 
unsuccessful, usually on the basis that marriage is an institution for 
                                            
69 See I. Lund-Andersen, “Cohabitation and Registered Partnership in Scandanavia:  The 
Legal Position of Homosexuals”, in J. Eekelaar & T. Nhlapo, eds, The Changing Family: 
Family Forms and Family Law (Hart, 1998). 
70 See W. Schrama “Registered Partnerships in the Netherlands” (1999) 13 Int. J. Law Pol. & 
the Fam. 315. 
71 See C. Martin and I. Thery, “The PACS and Marriage and Cohabitation in France” (2001) 
15 Int. J. Law, Pol. & the Fam.” 135. 
72 Bill H847 (2000). 
73 Marriage in every other jurisdiction is regarded as an institution ring-fencing heterosexual 
relationships.  This is understood at common law (see Corbett v. Corbett [1970] 2 All ER 33 
(England) and, to the same effect in South Africa,  W v. W 1976 (2) SA 308), under statute 
(see, in Scotland, s. 5(4)(e) of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 and in England s. 11(c) of 
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973) and under European Human Rights Law (Rees v. UK 
(1987) 9 EHRR 56; Cossey v. UK (1990) 13 EHRR 622). 
74 See Waaldijk at http//ruljis.leidenuniv.nl/user/cwaaldij/www/NHR/news.htm.   
75 See M. Dupuis “The Impact of Culture, Society and History on the Legal Process:  An 
Analysis of the Legal Status of Same-Sex Relationships in the United States and Denmark” 
(1995) 9 Int. J. L and the Fam. 86 at 88 - 95 for a discussion of the most important cases: 
Baker v. Nelson, 191 NW 2d 185 (1971, Supreme Court of Minnesota); Jones v. Hallahan 
501 SW 2d 588 (1973, Court of Appeals of Kentucky); Singer v. Hara 522 P2d 1187 (1974, 
Court of Appeals of Washington).  In Adams v. Howerton 673 F2D 1036 (9th Cir, 1982), unlike 
the other cases which sought to force the issuing of marriage licences, a marriage licence 
was actually issued to two men, but when legal recognition of the union was requested for 
practical purposes (in this case, immigration) the court refused.  The main social policy which 
justified giving marriage protected status was stated to be procreation.  De Santo v. Barnsley 
476 A2d 952 (1984) is interesting  -  a petition for divorce was raised by one man against 
another, the petitioner claiming that there existed a “common law marriage” (which seems to 
be half way between cohabitation and the Scottish concept of marriage by cohabitation with 
habit and repute) and claiming thereby financial provision.  The petition was rejected on the 
basis that “common law marriage” had to be identical, except in the lack of ceremony, to 
statutory marriage. 
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procreation and the rearing of children76.  More successful was the Hawaii 
case of Baere v. Levin77 in which the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the 
state had to produce compelling reasons why marriage should be limited to 
opposite-sex couples.  When it was unable to do so78, the way might have 
been open to same-sex marriage in that state, but for the fact that the 
Legislature responded by changing the constitution of Hawaii79.  In New 
Zealand an attempt was made in Quilter v. Attorney General80 to persuade the 
court that the Marriage Act 1955 was worded in gender-neutral terms and that 
it would be contrary to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 to interpret it in 
such a way as excluded same-sex marriage.  That attempt failed too.  It would 
seem that constitutional challenges through the courts to the very definition of 
marriage are unlikely to be successful81.  More successful, however, have 
been claims that it is discriminatory to deny same-sex couples some or all of 
the legal rights and liabilities that can be accessed by married couples: in 
other words claims to access the individual incidents of marriage, rather than 
the institution itself, are more likely to be successful.  The interesting feature 
about the Netherlands is that the marriage debate was played out  -  relatively 
uncontentiously82  -  in the legislature rather than the courts.  
                                            
76 Baker at 186, Singer at 1195. 
77 852 P2d 44 (Hawaii 1993).  For analysis, see Dupuis above at 95-98. 
78 Baere v. Miike 910 P2d 112 (Hawaii 1996). 
79 That change was retrospective: Baere v. Anderson 9 Dec. 1999.  The same occurred in 
Alaska after a case there called Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics 1998 WL 88743.  Around 
the same time as the Hawaii and Alaska cases, courts in the District of Columbia and New 
York State rejected marriage claims, on similar grounds to the earlier cases:  see Dean v. 
District of Columbia 653 A2d 307 (1995) and Storrs v. Holcomb 168 Misc. 2d 898 (1996). 
80 [1998] 1 NZLR 523.  For comment, see Butler, “Same-Sex Marriage and Freedom from 
Discrimination in New Zealand” [1998] PL 396. 
81 This conclusion is not inevitable.  The so-called “traditional” definition of marriage is simply 
the one that is accepted by the law of any legal system at any particular point in its history, 
and that definition is not immutable.  Not only do different countries define marriage differently 
(e.g. western countries normally define it as a monogamous union while some countries with 
a Muslim tradition define it to include polygamous unions) but single systems also change 
both their definitions (e.g. marriage was originally defined as a union for life, but that definition 
changed in Scotland in 1567 and in England in 1857 when divorce was introduced) and their 
rules for entry (e.g. the rules on a man marrying his deceased wife’s mother were changed in 
the UK by the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act 1986, and the bar on 
interracial marriage in some states in the USA was declared unconstitutional in Loving v. 
Virginia 388 US 1 (1967)). 
82 Waaldijk, n. 74 above, makes the revealing point that the Parliamentary debates were 
taken up mostly with concerns of whether Dutch same-sex marriages would be recognised 
abroad, and what would happen if one of the Royal Princes (or Princesses?) wanted to enter 
into such a marriage. 
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PART III:  SEEKING MEANING 
 
The narrative above shows that from about the mid-1990s on there has been 
an ever-increasing movement throughout the western world towards the legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships, starting with ad hoc recognition in 
limited circumstances, through an equiperation with cohabiting opposite-sex 
couples, and culminating, in some countries, in the introduction of institutions 
which, in all but name, are legal marriages83 and, in the Netherlands, is called 
marriage.  How are we to explain this sudden explosion of judicial and 
legislative right-thinking?  Part of the explanation must lie, of course, in the 
increased social acceptability and, vitally, social visibility of gay men and 
lesbians, and same-sex relationships, itself probably a consequence of 
decriminalisation, without which the environment of ignorance and distrust of 
“other” could never truly dissipate.  It is probably now not possible to separate 
out legal changes and social changes and to identify one as leading to the 
other  -  rather it is likely that they fed off and justified each other, but the 
catalyst for change, in either aspect, remains obscure.  Waaldijk, in his study 
of the sequenced steps towards legal recognition taken in the European 
countries84 explicitly locates the decriminalisation and anti-discrimination 
legislation which occurred in Europe primarily in the late 1960s and in the 
early 1980s, within the context of the civil rights movements seeking equality 
and justice for racial minorities and, latterly, of a more current international 
human rights movement.  Accessing this analogy is easy given that gay men 
and lesbians have little difficulty in pointing to a history of prejudice and 
discrimination; those who oppose them have substantial difficulty in 
distinguishing between race and sex discrimination (the moral and political 
arguments against which have long since been won85) and sexual orientation 
                                            
83 Though names are important in law.  If benefits are given to “spouses” and registered 
partnership is a separate institution from marriage, courts may choose, if they so desire (like 
the European Court of Justice in D. v. Council Case C-122/99P, May 31, 2001), to limit 
spousal benefit to institutions called marriage. 
84 See n. 4 above. 
85 I accept that actual discrimination on these grounds continues to exist and that the law’s 
response remains inadequate.  But the point is that it is morally and politically unacceptable to 
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discrimination (the arguments in favour of which remain in the eyes of many  -  
even those who disagree  -   within the bounds of morally and politically 
acceptable debate).  Edwin Cameron, one of the most cerebral of writers on 
South African law86 denies that it is possible so to distinguish the various 
forms of discrimination87.  He points out that, historically, a variety of 
arguments were deployed in the effort to justify the oppression of women and 
blacks  -  there were naturalistic/biblical arguments (the bible says that women 
have a different place in society from men, so the law must say so too88); 
arguments concerning “inherent” impediments (women have less judgment, 
and are weaker; blacks have less well-developed social and physical abilities); 
and arguments which sought to show that granting equality would change the 
existing order and would, therefore, be a precursor to social and moral 
disintegration.  In the light of this historical analysis, Cameron offers this 
insight:  “It is striking how many of these arguments, now superseded in the 
case of women or blacks, are still employed against gays [sic] and lesbians”.  
The more sexual orientation discrimination is identified with race and sex 
discrimination, the less easy it is to justify it.  There is cause to hope that this 
fact is being recognised at both a judicial and a legislative level.  True it is that 
in some countries, such as Canada, South Africa and Vermont (and in the 
future, probably, the UK) the hand of the legislature has been (or will be) 
forced by the judiciary’s interpretation of constitutional/human rights 
requirements; but this is not a universal truth and in many other countries, 
such as those European countries which have introduced registered 
partnerships, and Australian states like New South Wales and the ACT which 
have greatly enhanced the position of cohabitants and extended the definition 
thereof to include same-sex couples, the legislatures have, ex proprio motu, 
granted more and more rights and responsibilities to same-sex couples.  In 
any case, constitutional development can become a tool of the judiciary only 
                                                                                                                             
argue in favour of such discrimination. 
86 And now a judge of the Constitutional Court. 
87 (1993) 110 SALJ 450 at 461-2. 
88 The biblical arguments deployed in Loving v. Virginia 388 US 1 (1967) to justify bars on 
interracial marriage are typical of such arguments which attempt to justify racial 
discrimination. 
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when advanced by the legislature.  But it remains true that appropriate 
political will is a prerequisite to informed legislative change.89 
 
Political Considerations 
The change in political will leading to unexpected progress is, perhaps, most 
striking in South Africa.  Ronald Louw suggests90 that the granting of 
constitutional protection was arguably the most significant reason behind 
changed public attitudes towards gay men and lesbians.  It has certainly been 
the factor which, in that country, has led to the most significant legal 
developments, but the question remains: where did the political impetus to 
grant constitutional protection come from?  It is this question that is addressed 
by Carl Stychin, in a study of the political tactics adopted (with phenomenal 
success) by gay rights organisations in South Africa91.  He reminds us of the 
unique situation in that country where it was the politically dominant regime 
that came to realise (with the realisation of its own utter unsustainability) the 
necessity, in a democratic society, for protection of minorities to be 
constitutionally entrenched.  “Moreover”, he adds, “the political climate of 
South Africa remains one in which it is `politically incorrect’ for mainstream 
constitutional players to oppose the granting of equality rights to a group 
which can claim a history of social exclusion”92.  Yet there were countervailing 
considerations which made the ultimate victory in South Africa (which became 
the first country in the world explicitly to make sexual orientation discrimination 
unconstitutional93) by no means certain.  The strongly Calvinist tradition of the 
white community was reflected in the sexual conservatism of both the black 
                                            
89 Dupuis (above, n. 75) at 100 quotes the attorney in Baere v. Lewin (the Hawaii marriage 
case) pointing out the limitations to the legislative process in the absence of political will:  “If 
Martin Luther King had gone to the Alabama State Legislature for help, the schools would still 
be segregated today”. 
90 “Gay and Lesbian Partner Immigration and the Redefining of Family” (2000) 16 SAJHR 313 
at 319. 
91 “Constituting Sexuality: The Struggle for Sexual Orientation in the South Africa Bill of 
Rights” (1996) 23 J. Law and Soc. 455. 
92 Ibid., at 461. 
93 South African Constitution, s. 9(3).  Among the notable legal consequences of this 
provision were the striking down of the statute criminalising sodomy (National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517, 1999 (1) SA 6) and the 
extension of marital rights to same-sex couples for immigration purposes (National Coalition 
for Lesbian and Gay Equality v. Minister for Home Affairs 1999 (13) BCLR 280). 
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and the Asian communities94; in addition, as Stychin notes, the incoming 
democratic government had greater priorities than gay law reform, including 
the dismantling of apartheid and the tackling of the economic injustices 
endemic throughout South African society.  But in the end, the rhetoric of 
minority rights was simply too powerful to resist.  
 
Though there are few countries in the world today in which such rhetoric is as 
irresistable as in South Africa, in the wider legal community (at least within the 
western world) it is exactly this rhetoric of rights that is, more and more, 
informing the manner in which legal claims are being made.  John Dewar95, 
writing on changes in family law in general, sees same-sex relationship 
recognition as symptomatic of an increased contractualisation of family 
relationships and of an increasing constitutionalisation, through international 
human rights instruments, which is being brought to bear on issues which 
traditional family law saw as entirely within the realms of private law.  That 
constitutionalisation is even more apparent in the United Kingdom than 
Australia (from which perspective Dewar is primarily writing): the Human 
Rights Act 1998, the Scotland Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 are 
already resulting in court arguments being presented in a very different 
manner.  They have clearly raised the rights-consciousness of both litigants 
and individuals who perceive that they are not being treated fairly by the law.  
“Rights demand vindication”, says Dewar96: they trump other considerations 
such as welfare, family privacy, parental authority, and even the traditional 
place of marriage.  This constitutionalisation of rights overlaps with the 
increased contractualisation of families for, according to Dewar, rights by 
definition are individual and therefore their concern is not with the institution 
but with the individual’s claims upon the institution: the right of non-
discrimination, for example, is a direct challenge to the present definition of 
marriage.  Dewar’s thesis is to some extent vindicated by the fact that when 
the institution of marriage itself has been challenged by gay men and 
                                            
94 See as an example of this conservatism translating into judicial decision the case of Van 
Rooyen v. Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325, and its discussion by E. Bonthuys in “Awarding 
Access and Custody to Homosexual Parents of Minor Children: A Discussion of Van Rooyen 
v. Van Rooyen” (1994) 3 Stellenbosch L.R. 298. 
95 “Family Law and its Discontents” (2000) 14 Int. J. Law Pol. and the Fam. 59. 
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lesbians, the law (as was seen above) has been able to see off the challenges 
without much difficulty, but when the individual rights flowing from that 
institution are sought, as for example spousal support in M v. H, succession 
rights as in Fitzpatrick, immigration rights as in National Coalition, or even all 
the individual attributes of marriage as in Baker v. Vermont, the law has been 
unable to resist the rationalist arguments and success has been 
extraordinary. 
 
Political advancement is, of course, usually the result of pragmatism and 
compromise, and while increased recognition of same-sex relationships is 
broadly to be welcomed, there are dangers to the gay and lesbian community 
in accepting recognition on other people’s terms  -  even when these are the 
only terms on offer.  Stychin97 makes a valid point when he says that the 
conservative rhetoric that gay and lesbian activists in South Africa adopted 
(such as that gayness is immutable and fixed at birth and that therefore gay 
people pose no threat to the general population in terms of conversion or 
promotion of their orientation) limits its own radical agenda by its acceptance 
of categorisations that might not reflect reality98.  A similar argument to 
Stychin’s is made in the American context by Nancy Polikoff99.  She points out 
that the struggle for recognition of gay and lesbian relationships becomes 
more successful the more it denies its own social transformative agenda, and 
she draws an interesting analogy with the struggle for abortion law reform.  
That was originally argued on the basis of women’s liberation and women’s 
entitlement to sexual fulfilment, access to abortion being presented as part of 
a larger struggle to end male dominance; but access to abortion was only 
gained, and it seems can only be preserved, by adopting a much more 
conservative “pro-choice” rhetoric which implies that abortion is an evil, 
though a necessary one.  Her worry is that we get what we ask for  -  access 
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99 “We Will Get What We Ask For:  Why Legalising Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not 
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to a necessary evil rather than the end of male dominance, access to an 
inherently gendered institution rather than the breakdown in all relationships 
which depend upon and are defined by gender-allocated roles.  For this 
reason, it is all the more important that the tactics adopted by those seeking 
justice and equality for gay men and lesbians eschew the institutionalisation of 
relationships.  This is a matter to which I shall return at the end of this chapter. 
 
The Privatisation of Family Law 
Other writers suggest that the increased legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships is not a result of the constitutionalisation of family law (i.e. 
turning the subject into an aspect of public law) but exactly the reverse.  
Family law is, according to Susan Boyd100, primarily concerned with the 
privatisation of social welfare and she suggests that the legal recognition of 
same-sex relationships must be seen in that light and perhaps even explained 
by that imperative.  She points out101 that the trite statement that the family is 
the basis of society is in fact founded on a privatisation model where the 
family is allocated the costs of producing and rearing children and of caring for 
dependent family members.  Queer theorists, she argues, should resist the 
“family” since it reflects heteronormativity where society is still, if to a lesser 
degree than before, structured around a norm whereby women assume 
greater responsibility than men for these caring roles, which fact is itself both 
reflected and perpetuated in the labour market.  In many areas of family law 
the state is stepping back102 and encouraging individuals to seek private 
remedies rather than state ones: it is the public purse that is served by 
allowing same-sex couples to seek, for example, support from each other.  
Commenting on an earlier stage of  M v. H, in which the Supreme Court of 
Canada recognised a same-sex couple explicitly because (inter alia) to do 
otherwise would throw the cost of maintaining the applicant onto the public 
purse, Boyd says this:  “The more decisions such as M v. H, which privatize 
responsibility for financial well-being, are applauded, the more the tide of 
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shrinking public responsibility and expanded private responsibility is invited 
into our homes and families”103 .  There is a paradox here, of course, in that 
the law is pursuing (or at least drifting into) a right-wing model of society in 
which the role of the state is progressively diminished and individuals are 
encouraged to take more and more responsibility for themselves (leaving 
those unable to do so more and more vulnerable), while at the same time the 
right-wing tendency to sanctify the “traditional” family is, together with religious 
arguments, the main source of opposition to equality and justice for gay men 
and lesbians. 
 
Another Canadian writer, Claire Young104, makes similar points to those made 
by Boyd but addresses in addition some unpalatable consequences to legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships.  She points out that recognition in the 
tax and welfare regime might result in disadvantage overall, particularly in the 
case of low-income couples, where aggregation of income for means-tested 
benefits is presently avoided105.  The benefits of recognition will go to those 
already economically advantaged and, given the gendered structures of 
property ownership and wealth creation that persist in all modern societies, 
that means that recognition is likely to benefit men at the expense of women.  
The gay male agenda, which is driving reform, may not, Young implies, reflect 
the needs of lesbian women.  Boyd does not go quite this far, but she 
concludes that recognition is not about redistribution of wealth, either amongst 
the sexes, or amongst the different economic strata in society.  She does not, 
of course, suggest that this is a reason to oppose recognition and her aim, I 
think, is simply to point out its limitations:  “my key concern”, she says106 “is 
that lesbian/gay struggles for legal recognition of relationships, while clearly 
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necessary, ought not to be seen as sufficient to achieve social equality across 
class, race and gender differences as they intersect with sexuality”.  If this is 
so, then the reform agenda which aims to rid the law of distinctions based on 
sexual orientation rather than on other grounds serves lesbians as well as it 
serves gay men and, in further answer to Young’s concerns, recognition 
serves lesbians proportionately better than it serves gay men in parenting 
issues where, for entirely practical reasons, access is easier for women than 
for men.  While the battles for recognition have been fought in primarily 
economic terms (spousal support, succession to tenancies etc) it is submitted 
that the real point of these battles has been to achieve equality, justice and 
dignity for gay men and lesbians generally rather than economic advantages 
for individual pursuers.  One can understand Susan Boyd’s sardonic reaction 
to the success of M v. H: “Oh good”, she tartly remarks, “now we get to sue 
each other”107.  But the point is that, other than in cases involving children, 
family law is by and large a system for redistributing property.  Equality, 
justice and dignity are advanced if the same access to courts and to legal 
remedies is granted to gay as to non-gay people  -  and, crucially, if the same 
economic disadvantages as well as advantages are obtained.  To put it 
crudely, equality requires taking the rough with the smooth.108 
 
The Threat of Assimilation 
While most queer theorists and gay activists welcome the increasing legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships described above many, as we have 
already seen, do not welcome all the possible implications.  There is a 
particular resistance by some writers (myself included) to a strategy that 
seeks recognition through the medium of “marriage”109 because of the danger 
that institution poses of “assimilation”.  I have argued previously110 that 
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“marriage” ought not to be the primary goal for gay activists since it is, 
inherently, a heterosexist institution which will respond to the needs and 
aspirations of the heterosexual majority rather than, where different, the 
needs and aspirations of gay men and lesbians.  Nancy Polikoff111 similarly 
argues against same-sex marriage on the ground that recognition of same-
sex marriage will do nothing to challenge the present opposite-gendered 
characteristics of marriage, and she fears that the influence will in fact be the 
other way around, with same-sex couples facing social as well as legal 
pressure to conform to the heterosexual ideal.  She points out that recognition 
of same-sex relationships, where it has occurred, tends to be accorded to 
those relationships which are closest in form to opposite-sex relationships, 
and which follow the normative rules evolved in that context112.  Other writers 
too make similar points113.  Katherine O’Donovan114, for example, points out 
the paradox that both registered partnerships and increased recognition of 
cohabitation take (heterosexual) marriage as the unquestioned model to 
aspire to and she pertinently asks115 what it is about “marriage” that so attracts 
those, such as gay or lesbian couples, who are currently excluded.  Her 
answer is that it is the mythology behind marriage that is being sought, its 
“status as icon”116 and, though she does not use this language, she warns gay 
men and lesbians against whoring after false gods.  Eric Clive, many years 
ago, gave what remains one of the most convincing rationalist arguments why 
the law should withdraw from marriage, leaving it as a sacrament for those 
wishing religious approval, rather as baptism is, and conferring legal 
consequences on relationships for reasons other than the entry into the 
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institution117.  Yet, as O’Donovan118 is at pains to point out, few people enter 
marriage for rationalist reasons119.  It may well be difficult to resist the 
argument that justice requires equal access to even a flawed and 
mythologised institution, but it is not impossible.  I suspect that true justice, 
cutting across sex, gender and orientation, requires the demythologising not 
only of marriage, but of the family itself.  For the “family” too, as a legal 
institution, carries assimilationist risks. 
 
It has already been seen how legislative advancement, even short of 
marriage, has, by and large, been possible only by minimising the differences 
between same-sex and opposite-sex relationships.  The same phenomenon 
can be seen in the strategies adopted by litigants seeking family rights less 
than marriage, whose success is more often than not founded upon the 
presentation of the same-sex couple as one emulating the heterosexist norm.  
Jenni Millbank120 illustrates this point starkly with an Australian case121 in which 
one member of a same-sex couple sought to be regarded as a “spouse” of the 
other and resorted to arguing that he was the “husband” because he took the 
“active” or “masculine” role in the relationship, as opposed to the “effeminate 
or female-acting partner” who took the “traditional female role”.  The attempt 
to access relationship rights failed in this case and the queer theorist’s 
response is equivocal.  Millbank comments that “as a litigative strategy it was 
oppressive not only to the diversity and originality of lesbian and gay 
relationships, positing them as mere mimics; it was also oppressive to gender 
equality within heterosexual relationships”.  The fact that the litigative strategy 
of emphasising similarities has been largely successful obscures but does not 
subvert Millbank’s point  -  that emulation of the most obvious features of 
opposite-sex relationships, which are not necessarily the most attractive (e.g. 
inequality, dependency, dominance), tends to validate them.  Not only is such 
an approach a direct threat to the queer world (for it has the effect of skewing 
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the reality of individual relationships, by the imperative  -  for entirely 
understandable tactical reasons  -  of presenting to the world a facade of 
heteronormativity within a homosexual environment), but it also ill-serves the 
straight world.  For a less recognised but no less real danger in assimilation is 
that it denies access to what the queer has to offer to the straight  -   a 
practical illustration of the fact that diversity and originality is not destructive 
but is liberating.  Equality, says Judge Sachs of the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa, demands not the suppression but rather the celebration of 
differences122. 
 
The underlying assumption, which it is certainly no part of my task here to 
challenge, is that the loss of a gay cultural identity123 would impoverish society; 
in addition, there is the other danger that assimilation would simply shift the 
goal-posts for those relationships that are outwith the law’s ken.   Drawing gay 
and lesbian relationships within a family norm, as presently understood, would 
as Boyd points out “draw lines between good homosexuals (middle-class, 
monogamous, double income) and bad homosexuals (gays who cruise the 
bars, baths and parks, and dykes who ride motorcycles topless)”.124  Currently, 
except in limited circumstances, the law recognises and legitimises opposite-
sex relationships only.  If recognition is extended to same-sex relationships 
only in those circumstances in which they look, to all intents and purposes, to 
be identical to opposite-sex relationships except in the gender mix, then the 
law really has not progressed very far at all.  It will continue to benefit long-
term, stable, monogamous relationships in which the parties share a home 
and accept long-term emotional and financial obligations towards one 
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another.  But, those relationships which do not, or will not, fit into that norm 
(established by and for heterosexuals), will continue to be excluded for all 
purposes whether or not, for particular purposes, it would be fair, just and 
reasonable to include them125.  And the law will continue to legitimise (and 
benefit) certain forms of family relationship while at the same time ignoring 
(and disadvantaging) others126.  Boyd’s point is that this imperative comes not 
from the concept of “family” but from capitalism itself, and she concludes that 
“unless lesbian and gay efforts to achieve symbolic recognition of their 
families are accompanied by trenchant critiques of the limits of such 
recognition in delivering a redistribution of economic well-being, they will 
remain incomplete as political strategies, while they may simultaneously be 
the only legal strategies available”127.  Recognition of same-sex relationships, 
she fears, is only likely on heterosexual terms, which challenges neither 
heteronormativity nor present socio-economic structures.  It may be 
responded to this that it is not the purpose of same-sex relationship 
recognition to challenge capitalism, but it is, surely, its purpose to challenge 
heteronormativity, in the sense of questioning why one family structure should 
be preferred over another.  And if heterosexuality as the identifier of rights and 
liabilities can be successfully challenged then the way is open to challenge 
other identifiers whose only justification lies in normativity, conformity, and 
history. 
 
Family Law as a Maineian Movement 
In 1861, Sir Henry Maine published his best-known work, Ancient Law,  and 
there he argues128 that the movement of legal systems from the primitive to 
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the progressive has been uniform in one respect, that is to say by the gradual 
dissolution of family dependency and the growth of individual obligation in its 
place.  “The Individual”, he says, “is steadily substituted for the Family, as the 
unit of which civil laws take account.”  The legal ties between people become 
progressively governed by Contract, rather than by the reciprocity of rights 
and duties that make up Family; and in his famous epigram Maine concludes 
that the movement from ancient to modern law can be characterised as a 
movement “from Status to Contract”129.  For over 100 years after these words 
were written, the family, as a source of rights and obligations, remained 
stubbornly a status-based institution.  Automatic rights and liabilities, powers 
and responsibilities, continued to be drawn from status-defined institutions, 
most importantly marriage (for the domestic relations between adults) and 
legitimacy (for the domestic relations between adults and children).  Marriage 
remains the primary source of automatic rights and duties between adults, 
and while legitimacy as a status has all but disappeared, it has been replaced 
by the (admittedly more acceptable but still problematical) status of Parent.  
Succession rights, maintenance obligations, criminal and evidentiary 
immunities and all the other legally imposed consequences of family life 
remain by and large dependent on the status of marriage or parent. 
 
However, the law of domestic relations in the United Kingdom is showing 
some evidence of escaping from the shackles of status, at least in respect of 
adult-adult relationships.  The new constitutionalism introduced at the turn of 
the 21st century, with its emphasis on individuality, rationality and the need to 
identify the legitimate purpose behind the law, is likely to speed the process.  
As well as the tax and social security legislation, where it has long been in the 
state’s (financial) interest to recognise non-marital conjugal cohabitation, there 
have been a few statutory provisions extending rights and liabilities to non-
marital couples, for sometimes the very purpose of the law would be 
subverted if it insisted on tying in legal consequences to status.  A relatively 
early example of statutory recognition of non-marital relationship for this 
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reason is found in the domestic violence legislation.  The Matrimonial Homes 
(Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981 grants various forms of protection 
from domestic violence to the parties to a marriage, but since these 
protections (limited, be it admitted) can be accessed only when individuals 
can prove that their personal circumstances require it there was no 
institutional need automatically to deny access to those who did not evidence 
the appropriate status.  So the protections could be, and were, extended to 
the parties of non-marital (opposite-sex) couples.  The following year the 
Administration of Justice Act 1982 amended the Damages (Scotland) Act 
1976 and the (English) Fatal Accidents Act 1976 to include within the 
definition of “relative” who could sue for negligently caused death of another 
the survivor of a non-marital (opposite-sex) couple.  Again such legislation, 
requiring as it does proof of negligence, never was based on status alone and 
there is no reason in practicality, therefore, to deny a claimant a right to prove 
the appropriate relationship at the same time as also proving the other 
elements necessary for the claim.  Though in its terms the 1981 legislation is 
limited to opposite-sex couples, there is no rational basis upon which same-
sex couples should be excluded from the protections contained therein and 
the Act is, for that reason, clearly incompatible with the ECHR.  The Damages 
(Scotland) Act 1976 can, for reasons explored elsewhere130 be reinterpreted 
consistently with the ECHR so that same-sex couples can be brought within 
its terms.  The law has, however, proved far more resistant to extending 
recognition of non-marital relationships to areas of the law in which proving 
status is all that is required to access a benefit (such as, for example, in the 
law of succession or of maintenance131). 
 
Dewar132, we saw above, pointed out the opportunities for recognition of 
same-sex couples in this movement from status to individuality.  He 
suggested that as we come to recognise rights inhering in individuals it is the 
individual who becomes the focus of the law’s attention rather than the 
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institutions they are part of and from which they derive status.  This does, of 
course, come at a cost.  Rebecca Bailey-Harris points out133 that moving from 
status to individuality involves a movement from a system of absolute rules to 
one of discretionary or evaluative rules, and that this in turn involves a 
diminution in both predictability and, consequentially, the chances of extra-
judicial settlement of disputes.  However, if the end-result is justice and 
equality for gay men and lesbians, as well as a more equitable approach to all 
family disputes, then it is suggested that this is a price well worth paying. 
 
Conclusion 
I promised to address two questions in this third part of this chapter:  how to 
explain the sudden burgeoning of advances in legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships, and what that tells us about contemporary family law.  The 
explanations, as we have seen, are primarily political and constitutional.  What 
it tells us about family law is that the law is moving away from “family” as a 
source of rights and liabilities.  The logical end-result of this movement would 
be the withering of any legal doctrine known as “family law”, as the individual 
aspects of property law, unjustified enrichment, obligations, and domestic 
violence law take on lives of their own.  It is, admittedly, odd for a self-
confessed family lawyer to regard this as a good thing, but there it is: for 
better or for worse, I do. 
 
                                            
133 “Law and the Unmarried Couple  -  Oppression or Liberation?” (1996) 8 C & Fam. L. Q 
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